Censorship is an odious enterprise. We oppose censorship and classification by governments because they are alien to the American tradition of freedom. Much of this nation's strength and purpose is drawn from the premise that the humblest of citizens has the freedom of his own choice. Censorship destroys this freedom of choice.
1 n 2001, prisoners in Pennsylvania challenged a prison policy prohibiting them from watching films rated R, X, or NC-17. The prison policy was designed to implement the Zimmer Amendment, 2 which denies funding to any prison that shows R, X, or NC-17 films. 3 After the District Court denied the prisoners' claims in a cursory opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit remanded for a more fact-sensitive analysis.
Ostensibly, the eventual disposition of this case may appear rather unimportant. Many may question why much attention should be paid to whether prisoners should have the right to view certain films; however, there are actually several important questions raised by this case and other cases dealing with the Zimmer Amendment. Initially, courts have traditionally held that the MPAA ratings lack any clear standards and that they are legally unenforceable. If a court upholds the provision of the Zimmer Amendment that prohibits funding to prisons showing R, X, or NC-17 films, it will essentially be saying that the MPAA ratings can be used by certain governmental agencies to censor films. This is diametrically opposed to the central purposes of the MPAA ratings: establishing selfregulation and curbing government censorship.
Despite federal courts' gradual recognition of their role in vindicating prisoners' rights in the 1960s, the courts are increasingly deferring to the government when crafting prison policies. The Zimmer Amendment, and the Pennsylvania prison policy based on it, have presented the federal courts with an opportunity to play a leading role again in vindicating prisoners' rights. 4 Both the Zimmer Amendment and the Pennsylvania policy were apparently passed to punish prisoners, despite there being no factual findings that the laws actually advanced any penological interests. While the
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A in Wolf v. Ashcroft and the Constitutionality of Using the MPAA Ratings to Censor Films in Prison -By Colin Miller* District Court failed to reach the right result on its initial review, it now has the opportunity on remand to hold that the government's sole reliance on the MPAA ratings was improper and that the regulations in question were unconstitutional. Part I of this article looks at the history of the federal courts' jurisprudence in deciding prisoner's rights cases, culminating in the current test adopted in Turner v. Safley. Part II considers the purposes behind the Zimmer Amendment and looks at the district and appellate court rulings in the Pennsylvania prisoners' case, Wolf v. Ashcroft. Part III looks at the history of the MPAA ratings and cases dealing with their legal enforceability. Finally, Part IV applies Turner's test to the Zimmer Amendment and the Pennsylvania policy prohibiting R, X, and NC-17 movies from being shown in prison, ultimately concluding that the Zimmer Amendment is unconstitutional because it impermissibly relies on the MPAA ratings.
There was a time, not so very long ago, when prisoners were regarded as 'slave[s] of the State,' having 'not only forfeited [their] liberty, but all [their] personal rights.' 5 From the drafting of the Constitution until the 1960s, 6 federal courts applied the "Hands-Off" Doctrine, under which the courts refused to hear prisoners' claims. 7 The central tenet of the "Hands Off" doctrine was that courts should not interfere with the treatment of inmates in prison unless they are illegally confined. 8 Perhaps the best illustration of the doctrine is provided by the case of Ex parte Pickens. 9 In that case, a prisoner in Alaska challenged his imprisonment in an overcrowded cell, with a coal stove presenting "the ever present possibility of fire" and no method of escape. 10 The Court recognized that "the place [was] not fit for human habitation" and that cramming so many prisoners into such a small and dangerous cell constituted a "fabulous obscenity."
11 Nonetheless, consistent with the Hands-Off Doctrine, the court held that "the punishment now suffered by the petitioner, while inexcusable and shocking to the sensibilities of all civilized persons, is not of such nature as… to justify discharge of the petitioner at this time." 12 When reviewing prisoners' rights claims at the time when the "Hands Off" doctrine was still in place, courts advanced five general reasons given by courts for failing to question prison policies: "(1) separation of powers; (2) federalism; (3) judicial incompetence in prison administration; (4) fear of undermining prison disciplinary schemes; and (5) desire to avoid a flood of litigation." 13 In the 1960s, several federal district courts began to acknowledge that prisoners retained at least some Constitutional rights. More generally, courts simply recognized that "the penal system [had] failed to achieve its public protection, crime reduction, and offender rehabilitation objectives."
The United States Supreme Court first gave prisoners' claims legal support by unofficially revitalizing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 16 in Monroe v. Pape.
17
Section 1983 allows civil actions for government deprivations of constitutional rights. In Monroe, the Court found that federal courts were obligated to hear claims that state officials were violating federal rights. 18 Even before the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that prisoners could bring claims under section 1983, state and federal courts had considered prisoners' claims based on the Court's opinion in Monroe. 19 In the 1964 case of Cooper v. Pate, 20 the Court recognized that prisoners could bring claims under section 1983, explicitly legitimizing prisoners' suits. 21 In Cooper, the Court addressed a prisoner's claim that he had been denied "permission to purchase certain religious publications" and other unspecified privileges. 22 Although the Court did not reach the merits of Cooper's claim, it reversed the district court's dismissal of Cooper's complaint. 23 Additionally, the Court recognized that prisoners retain some rights while in prison and that courts can hear cases where prisoners allege their rights have been unlawfully violated. 24 The Court's decision in Cooper was prompted by increased pressure from two primary sources. First, prisoners themselves were becoming more proactive. 25 For instance, Black Muslims launched a number of attacks against the discriminatory treatment they endured because of their religious practices. 26 Second, whereas inmates were previously forced to proceed pro se, they now were supported by new public and private funding for legal representation for prison litigants. 27 Rather than deciding to continue to deny inmates' claims, the Court responded to this pressure by recognizing that inmates could bring certain claims that their rights had been violated by the government.
There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country. 28 In acknowledgment of lower court decisions, the Supreme Court in 1974 recognized that prisoners' rights are not categorically eviscerated when they pass through prison walls. Marshall's concurrence established the "retained rights" doctrine that would eventually be adopted by the Court. 31 The Court's holding reflects the doctrine that a prisoner "retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him by law." 32 This "retained rights" doctrine has guided the Court's analysis for the last several decades. 33 The Court filled in the substance of this doctrine by establishing the standard of review for prisoner's rights cases in Procunier v. Martinez, 34 the first prisoner's rights case the Supreme Court decided on its merits. 35 The case concerned the constitutionality of two prison regulations. The first regulation restricted inmates' personal correspondences, 36 while the second regulation categorically prohibited lawyers from using law students and legal paraprofessionals to interview prisoners. 37 Instead of focusing on the prisoners' rights, the Court determined that the regulations unconstitutionally infringed upon the First Amendment rights of non-prisoners to communicate freely with the prisoners. 38 As such, the Court invalidated the regulations using a strict scrutiny standard of review, 39 finding that the regulation was not narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.
Later that year, the Court made clear that a much more deferential standard applies when a prison regulation impinges solely upon a prisoner's rights. In Pell v. Procunier, 40 the Court considered the constitutionality of a prison regulation restricting inmates' ability to be interviewed by the press. 41 Initially, the Court found no violation of the First Amendment rights of the press because the press has the same right of access to prisoners as the general public. 42 Unlike in Martinez, Pell solely focused on the rights of prisoners. Rather than adopting Martinez's searing strict scrutiny standard, the Pell decision held that prison policies impinging solely on prisoner's rights were to be judged under the more deferential reasonableness standard. 43 Using this standard, the Court should then engage in an ad hoc balancing test, measuring inmates' rights against the legitimate penological interests of the state. 44 If a court finds that the state reasonably balanced individual rights against state interests in enacting a prison policy, the policy should be held to be constitutional. 45 For over a decade, the Court decided prisoner's right's cases under Pell's deferential balancing test. 47 However, lower courts' application of the Pell test resulted in inconsistent reasoning and results. 48 Because of this lack of consistency across circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Eighth Circuit case, Turner v. Safley.
49
Turner involved two class action suits against Missouri prison regulations. 50 The first regulation prohibited correspondence between inmates at different penal institutions unless "the classification/ treatment team of each inmate deems it in the best interest of the parties involved." 51 The inmates challenged this regulation on the ground that it abrogated First Amendment free speech rights. The second regulation prevented inmates from marrying unless they received "permission of the prison, and…such approval should be given only 'when there are compelling reasons to do so.'" 52 The prisoners challenged this regulation on the ground that it violated their right to marry under the due process clause.
The In January of 1995, Congressman Dick Zimmer first introduced the Zimmer Amendment, which I will refer to as the Amendment, also known as the "No Frills Prison Act," 59 as part of the Republican "Contract with America." One of the provisions of the Amendment is that "none of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Bureau of Prisons shall be used to provide…the viewing of R, X, and NC-17 rated movies, through whatever medium presented…." 60 Congress initially enacted the Amendment as section 611 of the Omnibus Budget Act of Fiscal Year 1997 and has reenacted the Amendment every year. 61 The basis for the Amendment was a belief that "'[p]risons should be places of detention and punishment; prison perks undermine the concept of jails as a deterrence. They also waste taxpayer money…. '" 62 Zimmer felt that some criminals believed that life in jail was an acceptable alternative to the "real" world because of a perceived increase in available luxuries. 63 The purpose of the Amendment, therefore, was to eliminate these luxuries. Zimmer felt that the Amendment achieved this goal by requiring federal prisons to provide the minimal amount of luxuries (i.e., basic food, clothing, and other necessities) without denying them constitutional rights or causing disciplinar y problems because of harsh prison conditions. 64 In order to comply with the Zimmer Amendment, a federal penitentiary in McKean, Pennsylvania, instituted a policy that "[n]o movies rated R, X, or NC-17 may be shown to inmates." 65 Inmates objected to the categorical nature of this prohibition and to the Zimmer Amendment. A class action suit on behalf of federal prisoners was soon filed by Jere Krakoff, an attorney with the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project in Pittsburgh. 66 The prisoners argued that certain R-rated films such as "Schindler's List," "Amistad," "Glory," and "The English Patient'" should not be banned in prison. 67 In defense of their censorship of these films, the government pointed to several legitimate penological interests supporting a categorical ban: "that the movies posed security risks …that the absence of such movies deterred people from committing crimes, [and] that denial of such movies fosters rehabilitation." 68 The prisoners' case was heard before the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania after a federal magistrate hearing.
69
The Magistrate had advised that the court should not make a decision under Turner until an evidentiary record was developed. 70 In a four page opinion contradicting the recommendation of the federal magistrate, District Judge Sean J. McLaughlin found for the government, 71 finding that legitimate penological interests supported the government's policy. However, the District Court did not state which interest it found legitimate or why it found the interest to be legitimate. 72 The District Court also declined to engage in a substantive analysis of whether the government's policy was rationally related to a legitimate interest. Instead, the District Court dismissively claimed to adopt the "common sense" approach to the Turner reasonableness test as had been accepted by the Third Circuit 73 in Waterman v. Farmer.
74
II. The Zimmer Amendment and the Present Lawsuit
The prisoners appealed the decision, and Judge Marjorie Rendell delivered the opinion in which the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court. 75 The Third Circuit first found the District Court's opinion "deficient in that it never stated or described the interest purportedly served by the prison policy, nor did it determine whether the interest was neutral and legitimate." 76 The Third Circuit also rejected the 'common sense' approach taken by the District Court in finding that the prison policy was rationally related to legitimate penological interests. The Third Circuit held that "while the connection may be a matter of common sense in certain instances …there may be situations in which the connection is not so apparent and does require factual development." 77 Ostensibly questioning the legitimacy of the government's interest in crime deterrence by banning R and NC-17 movies, the Third Circuit asked whether it "is a matter of common sense, as was argued here, that prohibiting movies rated R or NC-17 deters the general public from committing crimes, lest they be sent to prison where they are not permitted to watch R-rated movies?" 78 The simple answer was that the Court was "not so sure," 79 83 According to the Third Circuit, the first Turner factor can be dispositive only in favor of a prisoner challenge, for "if the connection is arbitrary or irrational, then 'the regulation fails, irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its favor.'" 84 Turner's first factor is thus only "foremost" in cases where the prison policy is truly arbitrary. 85 Judicial reasoning that satisfies the first factor in no way "subsum[es] the rest of the inquiry," 86 and a court "must then proceed to consider the remaining Turner factors in order to draw a conclusion as to the policy's overall reasonableness." 87 Thus, the Zimmer Amendment could not be upheld by a court solely because it satisfies Turner's first factor.
Movies have been regulated in the United
States for more than a century. The first recorded incident of censorship occurred in 1894, when "Dorolita's Passion Dance", an "erotic dance" kinetoscope, 88 was withdrawn from circulation. 89 Despite the Board's efforts, many people still protested the modified movies. These protesters gained substantial political power, and soon directed local police to "terrorize exhibitors in defiance of the industry's self-regulatory apparatus."
97 While some of these efforts were organized by private citizens, several city and state governments had also created censorship boards by 1911. 98 In response to these private organizers, industry members at a 1914 National Exhibitors' Convention cited local censorship as theater owners' most significant problem nationwide. 99 At the same time, it was becoming increasingly evident that the moderate National Board of Censorship lacked the clout to prevent increasing grassroots activism. 100 Consequently, the former National Board of Censorship reorganized itself as the National Board of Review and attempted to insulate the film industry from local regulation. 101 This attempt was to no avail, as the Supreme Court made self-regulation by the film industry even more difficult in Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio. 102 In Mutual Film Corporation, the Court upheld an Ohio statute creating a censoring board. Anyone desiring to show a film in Ohio had to screen the film before the board, which only approved those films it found to be "of a moral, educational, or amusing and harmless character." 103 The Court held that movies are not protected as free expression under the First Amendment; rather, movies are "a business, pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to be regarded…as part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion." 104 While the Court recognized that movies could be entertaining, it also cautioned that they are "capable of evil, having power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition." 105 After the Mutual Film Corporation decision, state legislatures promptly began considering how to regulate the motion picture industry. By 1922, legislatures in thirty-six states were considering bills allowing film censorship. 106 That same year, the motion picture industry decided to take drastic selfcensoring measures to insulate its movies from local censorship. Thus, it formed the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America ("MPPDA"), the predecessor of the current Motion Picture Association of America ("MPAA"). 107 The MPPDA established the draconian Hays Office Production Code, 108 which contained a strict set of rules preventing the showing of "immoral" conduct on film. 109 The Code had many guidelines long since forgotten in contemporary Hollywood: "For example, open mouth kissing was prohibited; a man and woman in bed, whether married or not had to keep one leg on the floor; verbal profanity was not allowed; bad guys did not escape justice." 110 The Code was enforced by the Production Code Administration (PCA), an in-house agency connected with California. 111 If a film contained "forbidden" elements, the PCA would refuse to affix the film with the Production Code seal of approval. 112 While the Code system was voluntary, failure to procure a seal essentially meant that a film would not be THE Supreme Court held that movies are not protected as free expression under the First Amendment. While the Court recognized that movies could be entertaining, it also cautioned that they are "capable of evil, having felt power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of expression." released because the big studios would not distribute films without the PCA seal of approval. 113 Many complained that the Code "stifled creativity," but that was exactly the point. 114 The MPPDA was willing to enforce strict selfimposed guidelines to deter states from moving forward with legislation that would prevent completed films from being shown in different parts of the country. On this front, the Hayes Code was largely successful. By 1925, all but one of the thirty-six states considering local censorship withdrew their attempts, allowing Hayes and the MPPDA to create national standards. 115 Twenty-three years later, the Supreme Court would fundamentally change the way motion pictures are made and distributed in the United States. In
U.S. v. Paramount Pictures,
116 the Court overturned the Court's argument in Mutual Film Corporation that movies were not protected by the First Amendment. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, made clear that "moving pictures, like newspapers and radio, are included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed by the First Amendment."
117
After Paramount, filmmakers began violating the Hayes Code standards. 118 In response, many states began banning films that were not PCA approved. However, based on Douglas' opinion in Paramount, the Court proceeded to strike down several state board bans of certain 'offensive' films. The net result of these decisions was that state censorship of films became virtually impossible. 119 Frustration at the state level resulted in a concomitant increase in activism at the grassroots level. 120 The reappearance of censorship at the local level was especially troublesome because local movie theaters need a positive relationship with the community to survive. 121 Rather than upset the community by showing prohibited films or challenging the prohibitions in court, movie theaters generally capitulated to the grassroots activism. 122 This local censorship put the movie industry in a worse position than when studios voluntarily adhered to PCA guidelines because local censors often targeted films that they had not even viewed. 123 Additionally, while filmmakers could appeal decisions of the PCA and have some overturned, there was no local appeals process. 124 127 The Supreme Court upheld the statute on the basis of "variable obscenity, the notion that a book or film might be made available to adults that would and should otherwise be banned for minors." 128 That same day, the Court decided Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas. 129 In Interstate Circuit, Inc., the Court held a Dallas censoring board decision classifying the film "Viva Mira" as "not suitable for young persons" to be unconstitutional. 130 The Court held that the standards used by the board to classify films were too vague and that "[i]t is essential that legislation aimed at protecting children from allegedly harmful expression…be clearly drawn and that the standards adopted be reasonably precise." 131 However, Justice Marshall then immediately cautioned that it was not the Court's place to draft such legislation. 132 The MPAA read the Court's decision in Interstate Circuit, Inc. as authorization to create a narrowly drawn private ratings system applicable to minors. 133 The MPAA had already been undergoing changes since 1966, when it appointed Lyndon Johnson's assistant Jack Valenti as its third President. 134 Recognizing the need for self-classification to avoid local censorship, Valenti initially auditioned the RATHER than upset the community by showing prohibited films or challenging the prohibitions in court, movie theaters generally capitulated to the grassroots activism.
Suggested for Mature Audiences ("SMA") rating to allow studios to experiment with more controversial topics. 135 Still, Valenti never saw this rating as anything more than an "interim solution." 136 
After
1968, Valenti had the legal precedent necessary to mobilize the movie industry into creating a universal, internal classification procedure that would largely prevent local censorship. Looking at Interstate Circuit Inc., Valenti thought that it "'said something that had a seminal ring to it, and it rang like a twanging wire through the whole fabric of viewing movies: They said children could be barred from seeing movies but no one could bar adults from seeing movies.'" 137 Valenti disagreed with legal censorship via classification, but understood the importance of a responsible reputation for MPAA. 138 After Interstate Circuit Inc., Valenti had the authority to create a voluntary self-classification system. 139 The MPAA and other film groups therefore created a new voluntary film rating system in November 1968. 140 What this rating system is not about is almost as important as what it is about. In his personal statement accompanying the adoption of the new rating system, Valenti noted that "there is 'no valid evidence…that movies have anything to do with anti-social behavior.'" 141 The system's purpose, then, is to warn parents against letting their children view a particular film. The ratings themselves do not censor or "even make a final evaluation on [the suitability of the film for minors]; except for the X-rating, the parent's decision remain[s] the key to children's attendance." 142 Valenti particularly noted that the MPAA ratings should not be the final standard used by parents in determining whether their children should see a film. Instead, Valenti recommended the ratings as merely a starting point, asserting that parents should also read magazines and local newspapers to determine what films they feel are appropriate for their children. 143 This goal of parental notification is the only goal of the system, and "[t]he only objective of the ratings is to advise the parent in advance so he or she may determine the possible suitability or unsuitability of viewing by children." 144 Valenti explicitly argued that the ratings' relevance pertained only to minors: "Inherent in the rating system is the fact that to those 17 and over, or without children, the ratings have little if any meaning." 145 The MPAA ratings are enforced by the MPAA-created Classification and Rating Administration (CARA). CARA is a full-time board of seven members, and no qualifications are required for board members to serve. 146 The Board reviews the film using four criteria -theme, language, nudity and sex, and violence. 147 A majority vote is required to set the rating, whether a G, PG, PG-13, R, or NC-17 rating. 148 No one criterion is weighed more heavily than any other in arriving at a rating, but the MPAA has come up with basic general descriptions of movies receiving each of the ratings. 149 While the rating system is voluntary, the great majority of producers submit their films to CARA to be rated. 150 The movie makers may make cuts based on CARA suggestions, or they may appeal to the Ratings Appeal Board. This board consists of twenty-four members of the MPAA, the National Association of Theater Owners (NATO), and the International Film Importers & Distributors of America (IFIDA). 151 After all sides present their case, the Board votes by secret ballot and can reverse CARA's decision only by a two-thirds vote. 152 The movie industry's adoption of CARA immediately led to the decline, and ultimately the extinction, of all local censorship boards. 153 While the MPAA ratings have gone largely unchallenged in the last three decades, three plaintiffs have successfully challenged the constitutionality of the government's reliance of the ratings. AFTER 1968, Valenti had the legal precedent necessary to mobilize the movie industry into creating a universal, internal classification procedure that would largely prevent local censorship.
The first case to challenge the MPAA ratings was Motion Picture Association of America v. Specter.
154
Specter concerned a new amendment to Pennsylvania's Penal Code. 155 In finding the amendment unconstitutional, the district court noted "that the Code and Rating Administration has…no defined standards or criteria against which to measure its ratings." 156 Prison Act" is constitutional. Specter was a case involving the restriction of First Amendment rights and Pennsylvania's Amendment was thus subjected to strict scrutiny. In contrast, under Turner, the state only need prove that its regulation was rationally related to a legitimate penological interest. At the same time, the court was clear that, even with the MPAA ratings, the Pennsylvania Amendment in Specter lacked "any ascertainable standards." 159 It is difficult to see, then, how the Pennsylvania law in Wolf or the "No Frills Prison Act" -both relying exclusively on the MPAA ratings -could even bear a rational relationship to any legitimate penological interests.
A month later, a Wisconsin District Court reached a similar conclusion in Engdahl v. City of Kenosha.
160 Kenosha adopted an ordinance that prevented individuals under age 18 from being able to see "adult" films. 161 The ordinance defined 'adult motion pictures as "…any motion picture which is rated under the Rating Program of the Motion Picture Association of America in a category recommending that minors, unaccompanied by a parent or guardian, be denied admission.'" 162 When a movie theater denied certain minors admission to the R-rated "Woodstock" when accompanied by adults, the minors challenged the ordinance as a prior restraint on their First Amendment rights. 163 upheld a school district's reliance on MPAA ratings when the school denied a student's request to see the movie "Schindler's List." The school's principal, acting at the behest of several teachers, initially sent a letter to the superintendent requesting permission for teachers to be able to take their students to the film during school hours. 168 The superintendent denied the request solely on the basis that the MPAA had given the film an R rating. The film therefore was "banned from the curriculum" by school district policy. 169 After this rejection, a student passed a petition around school requesting that the school board reconsider its decision. 170 The School Board took no action, and the students legally challenged the board's reliance on the MPAA ratings.
171
Because Borger involved school administration, the court used the rational basis test: "whether or not the defendants' decision bore a reasonable relationship to a legitimate pedagogical concern." 172 The court initially found that the school
B. Cases Dealing with Movie Ratings
AS in Spector, the court found that, "if the Motion Picture Association utilized any standards in reaching its judgments as to what is an 'adult' movie, the defendants are not aware of what these standards are." district presented a "legitimate pedagogical concern," namely, to prevent its students from watching films with excessive nudity, violence, and bad language.
173
The court found that reliance on the MPAA ratings was rationally related to this interest, finding that "a private organization's rating system cannot be used to determine whether a movie receives constitutional protection." 174 As opposed to the decisions of other bodies, decisions made by school boards about curriculum need only be rationally related to a legitimate pedagogical concern.
175 In Borger, the court held that the school board had presented enough evidence -such as MPAA press releases -to establish that reliance on MPAA ratings to ban films was rationally related to protecting school children from obscene material.
176
Borger still stands as the only case to uphold the MPAA ratings against constitutional attack by finding that the use of the ratings bore a rational relationship to the government's purported interest. Borger, however, is inapplicable to Wolf. Superficially, Borger seems highly similar to Wolf. Both involve challenges to policies banning films based solely on their MPAA ratings. One of the movies cited by the Wolf petitioners -"Schindler's List" -was the same movie at issue in Borger. Finally, the standard of review in Borger -the rational basis test -is the same standard that is applied to the prison policy in Wolf. What this comparison ignores, however, is that the MPAA rating systems are intended only to guide parents in deciding what films their children should watch.
177 Any penological interest the government has, therefore, has no rational relationship to using the MPAA rating system when censoring movies before an over-16 audience. This admitted limitation on the applicability and utility of the MPAA ratings beyond situations involving children lays the foundation for the argument that the Zimmer Amendment's absolute reliance on the ratings fails under Turner's rational basis test. 178 Turner supporting that determination in no way subsumes the rest of the inquiry. 183 While some have suggested that the first factor requires heightened scrutiny, most courts have held that this factor is the equivalent of rational basis review. 184 Ostensibly, this deferential standard lends credence to the validity of Pennsylvania's law prohibiting prisoners from viewing R, X, and NC-17 rated films. An incorrect analysis would merely require that Pennsylvania's ban on R and NC-17 films be rationally related to some legitimate penological interest. In this case, however, as in other prison censorship cases, the analysis is much more akin to an equal protection analysis.
To satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state must prove it has rational reasons for its disparate treatment of R, X, and NC-17 films and G, PG, and PG-13 rated films. In Morrison, the Ninth Circuit found a prison policy prohibiting prisoners from receiving "bulk rate, third, or fourth class mail" to be unconstitutional. 186 In the limited sense, the policy was 'rational' in that such mail could contain illegal contraband. However, this did not explain why the prison did not similarly prohibit prisoners from receiving first and second class mail. Thus, although the prison could prove that bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail sometimes contains contraband, it could not present any evidence that such contraband appeared with any less frequency in first or second class mail. 187 To satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state must prove it has rational reasons for its disparate treatment of R, X, and NC-17 films and G, PG, and PG-13 rated films. In Morrison, the Ninth Circuit found a prison policy prohibiting prisoners from receiving "bulk rate, third, or fourth class mail" to be unconstitutional. 188 In the limited sense, the policy was 'rational' in that such mail could contain illegal contraband. However, this did not explain why the prison did not similarly prohibit prisoners from receiving first and second class mail. Thus, although the prison could prove that bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail sometimes contains contraband, it could not present any evidence that such contraband appeared with any less frequency in first or second class mail. 189 In order to fulfill Turner's first factor, the prison would have "to submit…evidence demonstrating a rational connection between the postage rate at which a publication is sent and the risk of contraband." 190 Similarly, in order for the Zimmer Amendment or the Pennsylvania policy to pass constitutional muster, the state must be able to prove a rational connection between a film's MPAA rating and some legitimate penological interest.
Judge Rendell (the Third Circuit judge who remanded Wolf v. Ashcroft), the history of the Zimmer amendment, and the Zimmer Amendment itself seem to indicate that the Amendment's main purpose is to create a harsher prison environment. However, banning certain films may not actually create a harsher prison environment. A recent comprehensive study of film profits determined that PG films are more than twice as likely to gross at least $25 million domestically than R-rated films. 191 Further, the study also found R-rated films are less profitable on average than G, PG, and PG-13 films. 192 Movie studios recognize that PG and PG-13 movies have a greater potential to yield greater profits, and thus edit movies with the highest earning potential so that they are not rated-R. Many movies, therefore, that remain rated-R are actually those with limited commercial prospects. While there might be arguments to the
B. The First Factor: A Rational Connection Between Policies and Interests (1) Morrison v. Hall 185 and the Equal Protection Analysis
TO satisfy the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the state must prove it has rational reasons for its disparate treatment of R, X, and NC-17 films and G, PG, and PG-13 rated films.
contrary, neither those drafting, nor those defending, the legislation in question have presented any evidence that prisoners prefer Rrated films. Without such evidence, there is no reason to disrupt the general rule that people, as well as prisoners, on average prefer to see PG and PG-13 movies instead of R-rated movies.
According to the District Court in Wolf, the second potential purpose of the ban on films rated R, NC-17, or X is to facilitate the rehabilitation of prisoners. 193 The argument here is that prisoners exposed to excessive sex and violence in R, X, and NC-17 rated films may remain desensitized to pernicious behavior. However, CARA "does not rate for quality or lack of it" when giving a film a MPAA rating. 194 A movie with an excessive amount of violence will be given an Rrating, whether the movie glorifies violence or condemns it. Undoubtedly, a state can rationally argue that an R-rated movie will stunt a prisoner's rehabilitation by presenting images that glorify drug use and violence. However, PG-13 films may also glorify violence, and R-rated films may present antiviolence messages. For instance, Rob Cohen's PG-13 rated "XXX" and Stephen Spielberg's "Indiana Jones and the Temple of Doom" (the film which led to the somewhat arbitrary creation of the PG-13 rating after Spielberg's intense lobbying to the MPAA) contain numerous scenes of excessive violence, which the audience is supposed to applaud, while Terrence Malick's R-rated "The Thin Red Line" is anti-violence, showing the pernicious effects of the Battle of Guadalcanal on nature and man alike.
Sometimes, many PG-13 movies can leave a worse impression on viewers than R-rated films. A war film with an R-rating such as "Glory" can show the viewer in graphic detail the atrocities that resulted from the Civil War. A similar war movie with a PG-13 rating would contain less violence, but the viewer would be left with the impression that war is less devastating and that violence has minor consequences. However, even if there is some connection between the MPAA ratings and the state's penological interests, an absolute ban would still constitute an exaggerated response, and run counter to Turner.
Under Turner, a prison's policy must not be an "exaggerated response" to the behavior it wishes to proscribe. 195 For instance, in Bazzetta v. McGinnis, 196 a state passed a law preventing former inmates from visiting current prisoners. The Sixth Circuit found that the state had asserted a legitimate penological interest: "the prevention of disruption by exconvicts" 197 However, the state impermissibly reacted to this danger by categorically prohibiting all former inmates from making non-contact visits. 198 Because this policy prohibited all visits without individualized determinations of danger, many benign visits were also prevented. The law was therefore held to be unconstitutional, as it was an impermissible "exaggerated response" to the potential problems associated with visits by ex-convicts. 199 The absolute ban on all R, X, and NC-17 rated films constitutes a similarly exaggerated response. Some may well argue that certain films hinder the rehabilitation of certain prisoners and lead to antisocial behavior. Although unlikely, a (2) The Prison Policy Must Not Be An "Exaggerated Response" SOMETIMES, many PG-13 movies can leave a worse impression on viewers than R-rated films. A war film with an R-rating such as "Glory" can show the viewer in graphic detail the atrocities that resulted from the Civil War. A similar war movie with a PG-13 rating would contain less violence, but the viewer would be left with the impression that war is less devastating and that violence has minor consequences.
potential prisoner might avoid committing a crime because these movies are banned in prison, making the prison experience less enjoyable. However, many films that have neither effect are banned under this blanket policy. While a prison policy does not require an exact fit between means and ends, absolute reliance on the amorphous MPAA ratings is a particularly ill-fitting solution because MPAA ratings are irrelevant to adults.
Turner's second factor asks courts to look at whether alternative means of expressing the right in question remain open to prisoners. Courts have developed several sub-factors when applying this factor: defining the right broadly, looking at the broadness of the exclusion, focusing on the right to receive information, and holding that violation leads only to increased scrutiny. 200 The first part of the analysis of Turner's second factor is defining the prisoners' rights. In Turner and its progeny, Thornburgh v. Abbot, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "'the right' in question must be viewed sensibly and expansively." 201 In Thornburgh, the Court upheld regulations giving prison officials the power to reject incoming publications they thought jeopardized institutional security 202 because officials banned only certain publications, allowing a significant number of publications to be sent and received. 203 Using the same reasoning in O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 204 the Supreme Court examined a policy preventing prisoners from attending a specific religious ceremony because of the amalgam of religious practices already available to the inmates. 205 In addressing this issue, first, the Court looked to the fact that during non-work hours there remained a near absolute right to congregate for prayer and discussion. 206 Second, the state provided an imam whom prisoners could freely see. 207 Finally, the state made special arrangements for Ramadan, and offered alternative meals whenever the prison served pork. 208 After examining these three separate factors, the court ultimately found no absolute violation of the prisoners' right to free exercise of religion. The Court did not even reach the Turner factors because of its finding that no right was violated.
Based on the analyses in these cases, it is clear that petitioners challenging the Zimmer Amendment cannot simply argue that the right at issue is their specific right to view R, X, and NC-17 movies (and not some broader right) and that this right is categorically precluded by the Amendment to the extent that it prohibits all R, X, and NC-17 movies in prison. Instead, courts have found that the right must be viewed more expansively; it cannot be defined solely according to the items that the regulation excludes. 209 Unfortunately, though, according to at least one Circuit court, the Supreme Court has never articulated a clear method for how to define the right at stake. 210 Despite this narrow interpretation of Turner's second factor, the Court's analysis in Thornburgh v. Abbott 21 indicates that absolute reliance on the MPAA ratings is improper. Thornburgh involved a constitutional challenge to a prison policy allowing prison officials to exclude any incoming publications they felt would undermine institutional security. 212 However, under the policy, the warden had to review each publication separately, and could not simply create a list of excluded publications. 213 The Court was especially "comforted by the individualized nature of the determinations required by the regulation" and cautioned that "[a]ny attempt to achieve greater consistency by broader exclusions might itself run afoul of the second Turner factor, i.e., the presence of 'alternative means of exercising the right' in question." 214 The policy in Wolf or the Zimmer Amendment should be treated no differently than the policy in Thornburgh. Ostensibly, both create blanket prohibitions on R, X, and NC-17 rated films without requiring or even allowing prison officials to make individualized determinations about specific films. In this sense, Wolf is similar to Kikumura v. Turner, 215 where a prison enacted a blanket ban on all Japanese language publications. In Kikumura, the court found this policy to be unconstitutional in part because it categorically prohibited a class of publications without the individualized analysis the Supreme Court found essential in Thornburgh. While it seems clear that the absolute prohibition in the Zimmer Amendment is overbroad, the question of how to define the right in question remains unanswered. The right could be construed as "the right to receive information," 217 as it was in Kikumura. Under this definition, the justification for finding that the prisoners' right to information was violated would be the converse of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Morrison v. Hall. 218 In Morrison, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a prison policy that prevented prisoners from receiving magazines in bulk rate, third, and fourth class mail. The court struck the policy down and rejected the argument that visual media are the equivalent of print media, 219 reasoning that the two cannot be conflated because prisoners have such low literacy rates. 220 Visual media are thus inadequate alternatives to printed words because they do not allow prisoners to learn the literacy skills necessary to succeed upon their reintegration into society.
The converse to this analysis should apply with equal force. If prisoners cannot read, then their only method of learning about an event of historical importance may be through viewing a movie. Illiteracy may constructively prevent these prisoners from learning about historical events through the written word. Further, only films with extreme depictions of violence may be able to accurately portray the horrors of the Holocaust, as in "Schindler's List", or of the Civil War, as in "Glory." Films with less graphic violence often water down such pernicious events, making the events seem less devastating than they actually were. Consequently, many of the best historical films receive R ratings, meaning that prisoners are prohibited from seeing them under current policy. 221 However, to simply argue that prisoners are being denied the right to information would undercut the impact of movies on society. An individual can read about the Holocaust, but that same individual can be confronted with shocking visual depictions of the horrors of Nazi Death camps in an entirely different manner by watching "Schindler's List."
Because any film portraying the horrors of a pernicious historical event is likely to receive an R rating, under current policy, prisoners are being denied the unique opportunity to vicariously experience these events and further understand what occurred. While reading a book about history gives the reader some understanding, actually seeing historical events recreated gives the viewer an entirely different perspective.
No single Turner factor is dispositive. When a court finds that the second factor has been violated, the regulation is not necessarily "presumptively unconstitutional." Instead, the reviewing court must simply look at the policy's justifications with "increased scrutiny." 222 The "ripple effect" refers generally to an effect that occurs when accommodation of the right in question would negatively impact other prisoners and make the jobs of prison officials more difficult. Unfortunately, courts have implemented Turner's third factor in conflicting and often antithetical manners. Some circuits have held that Turner's third factor can only support upholding the prison's regulation. If accommodation would negatively impact prison administration, the regulation is likely rational; however, the absence of such a negative impact does WHILE it seems clear that the absolute prohibition in the Zimmer Amendment is overbroad, the question of how to define the right in question remains unanswered. The right could be construed as "the right to receive information." not mean that the prisoner's right should be accommodated. These courts have held that, "[r]ather than allowing prisoners to speculate that the ripple effect would not be great, the factor allows prison officials the opportunity to show what impact accommodating the prisoners' religious principles might have on their prisons." 223 Turner does not phrase this factor as an additional burden on the state, but as an element which, if proven, should lead to greater deference to the prison policy. 224 Indeed, in Turner, the Supreme Court did acknowledge that, "[w]hen accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant 'ripple effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials." 225 Conversely, the Turner Court also recognized that only rare changes will have no impact on the rights of others or prison resources. 226 Based on this language, other courts have found that the state cannot prove a prison policy is constitutional merely by showing that accommodation will cause any impact. 227 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit has held that " [t] he obvious implication…is that a prison may not restrict a prisoner's rights without even looking to see how the rights might be accommodated and estimating the expense entailed in doing so." 228 In line with these cases, even a cursory review of the Zimmer Amendment and the Pennsylvania policy makes it evident that there would be no negative "ripple effect" by accommodating the right of prisoners to see certain R, X, or NC-17 rated movies.
As previously noted, accommodation of a right can have a "ripple effect" by negatively impacting other prisoners or by making the jobs of prison officials more difficult. An example of the former effect was found in Waterman v. Farmer. 229 In Farmer, the Third Circuit upheld a regulation on pornographic materials, reasoning that the alternative, a limited distribution to certain offenders determined not to be sexually deviant, would be ineffective because of the "ripple effect." 230 The court felt this "ripple effect" would be inevitable because, once the initial prisoners procured the pornographic material, they would be "more than likely to pass their material to other prisoners." 231 Showing certain R-rated films would not have the same "ripple effect." Presumably, before showing R-rated films, prison officials would make an independent determination that the films did not encourage violent, sexual, or other anti-social behavior. However, if prison officials did determine that a film was not suitable for a particular inmate, they could simply prevent him from attending the screening. Unlike in Waterman, the inmates in Wolf are not asking to possess the material (i.e. by receiving a videotape); they are simply asking that specific films be shown. As long as prison officials deny access to prisoners they feel should not see certain films, the prisoners will not be exposed to any dangerous material. Additionally, prison officials do not need to work harder to maintain security to prevent the acquisition of file copies by ineligible prisoners because the issue is simply the screening, not the possession, of films. Consider the previously cited Ninth Circuit opinion in Morrison v. Hall. 232 In Hall, the Ninth Circuit looked at the potential danger that prisoners might receive illegal contraband in different types of mail. 233 This concern does not exist when prisoners are merely viewing movies.
Courts have been extremely reluctant to find alternatives to prison policies that achieve the same penological interests without imposing additional burdens on prison officials. In Amatel v. Reno, 234 for instance, the D.C. Circuit upheld a ban on the use of Bureau of Prisons resources to purchase sexually explicit material for inmates. 235 In considering Turner's E. The Fourth Factor: Alternatives to the Policy COURTS have been extremely reluctant to find alternatives to prison policies that achieve the same penological interests without imposing additional burdens on prison officials.
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fourth factor, the D.C. Circuit held that "[t]he most obvious alternative is a detailed prisoner-by-prisoner (and presumably publication by publication) sifting to determine whether a particular publication will harm the rehabilitation of a particular prisoner. The costs of this approach seem far from de minimus." 236 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit dismissed a First Amendment challenge to inmate hair-grooming regulations. 237 The Court made clear that an alternative policy is sufficient only if it is equally effective when compared to the original policy, stating that "we can imagine means of achieving the prison's stated goals with less restraint on the prisoner's rights. Nevertheless, we find it unlikely that all of the penological interests satisfied by the regulation could be equally well satisfied by any of the alternatives proposed by the prisoners." 238 As far as such a stringent application of the fourth factor of Turner is concerned, the Supreme Court's own analysis in Turner suggests an alternative to prisons' absolute reliance on MPAA ratings when censoring certain films. Recall that in Turner, the Court struck down a marriage regulation "permit [ting] an inmate to marry only with the permission of the superintendent of the prison," even in light of the fact that to do so the superintendent had to present compelling reasons. 239 The Court found the policy unconstitutional, in part because of an available alternative policy which generally permitted marriages, unless "[the] warden finds that it presents a threat to security or order of [the] institution, or to public safety." 240 Clearly, this alternative policy required wardens to spend more time analyzing each potential marriage; however, under the alternative policy the Court shifted the presumption towards marriage by requiring valid reasons for its prohibition.
In the case of movies, a similar or even less intrusive alternative could be developed. As in Turner, the presumption could shift in favor of allowing any films to be screened, and the warden -perhaps relying on the MPAA ratings and other factorswould have to present affirmative reasons for why particular films should be censored. Alternatively, the presumption against R, X, and NC-17 movies could remain intact as long as an appeals process was in place. Thus, the warden could censor films based on their MPAA rating, but prisoners would have the opportunity to argue that some films have sufficient educational merit and lack the objectionable material prisons want to prohibit.
Additionally, several alternative ratings systems exist that prisons could easily use and that are more descriptive than the MPAA ratings. For example, the Film Advisory Board (FAB) issues film ratings closely analogous to the MPAA ratings. The Board was created in 1988 after independent video producers asked for a more descriptive film rating alternative than the MPAA. 241 The FAB, like the MPAA, reviews all released movies, but it states explicitly why films receive a certain rating, as opposed to the clandestine decision-making process of the MPAA. 242 While the MPAA now does include some content descriptions, the FAB ratings are much more thorough in describing objectionable material. Prison officials could thus use these ratings to more effectively determine which films they do not want their prisoners to see.
Another alternative would be the ratings at "Kids-in-Mind." 243 While the name suggests that the ratings are geared to children, the web site's recommendations are not age-specific. 244 Instead, the site assigns three separate ratings for (1) sex and nudity, (2) violence and gore, and (3) profanity. 245 Each of these categories receives a rating between zero and ten based on quantity and context. 246 This system would provide prison officials with much more detailed information than is provided by the MPAA ratings about whether a film has objectionable elements. The ratings systems of FAB and Kids-inMind are just two examples of a variety of rating systems that prison officials could use in lieu of MPAA ratings. 247 While the Third Circuit has rejected a common sense approach to the Pennsylvania prison policy and the Zimmer Amendment, 248 the District Court for the District of Columbia came to the opposite conclusion in Kimberlin v Specifically, the court in Kimberlin upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the Zimmer Amendment prohibiting the expenditure of federal funds to purchase electric and electronic instruments for federal prisoners. 251 The The court concluded that even though it was optimistic to believe that excluding these instruments would have any impact, it was not necessarily irrational. 253 If this indeed was Congress's intent when passing the Zimmer Amendment, it makes little sense. If potential criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes because they know that musical instruments are banned from prison, there is no reason that they will be deterred by the general prospect that the prison environment has become less pleasant. Clearly, the court is not persuaded by the argument that a potential criminal would be deterred because his musical talents would be stunted while in prison. But, the court has apparently accepted the argument that a potential criminal might be dissuaded from committing a crime by remembering that electric instruments are banned from prison, making prison a "harsh place" he needs to avoid.
These are tenuous arguments, yet the court urges acceptance of the latter based on "common sense." 254 According to his reading of Amatel, Sullivan argued that a court can find a rational link between a prison policy and a governmental interest based on "common sense" without having to rely on record evidence. 255 Yet Congress passed the Zimmer Amendment "without fact finding or consulting with prison officials and administrators." 256 Apparently using common sense, Sullivan simply concluded that because "the policy deprives plaintiffs of electrical instruments as a comfort and amenity, the prison is somewhat harsher." 257 The court misses the point. The ban on electric instruments or any of the provisions of the Zimmer Amendment likely do make prison a harsher place. However, the dispositive question is whether potential prisoners will be deterred from committing crimes because of fewer amenities available in prison. 258 If the penological interests of the prison are served by abrogating a particular right, then accommodating that right will mean the prison cannot fully achieve its interest. The BOP's argument would thus make Turner's third factor a tautology.
The real purpose of Turner's third factor, however, is to determine whether accommodation of the right would also have a "ripple effect." While accommodation of the right in Kimberlin might indirectly have resulted in prison overpopulation, there were no arguments presented as to why introducing electronic instruments into prisons would cause any harm beyond making the prison environment less harsh. In other words, the BOP never stated that allowing prisoners to have electronic instruments would directly lead to any negative consequences in prison. Similarly, nobody has presented the similar argument that allowing prisoners to view R, X, or NC-17 rated films would directly lead to any negative consequences.
IF potential criminals would not be deterred from committing crimes because they know that musical instruments are banned from prison, there is no reason that they will be deterred by the general prospect that the prison environment has become less pleasant.
Courts are currently at an impasse when dealing with prisoners' rights cases and the MPAA ratings. Federal courts had been moving toward a more active role in vindicating prisoners' rights before the Supreme Court's decision in Turner. After Turner, the question remains whether there is any significant role for federal courts to play in reviewing prison policies.
The Zimmer Amendment and prison policies resulting from it have presented federal courts with the opportunity to apply a stronger standard of review to prison policies. The provisions of the Amendment made prison conditions harsher for prisoners, yet there are no legislative findings that toughening the prison environment actually deters potential criminals. When reviewing the Amendment, district courts in D.C. and Pennsylvania have upheld the provisions based on a deferential "common sense" approach. By remanding Wolf v. Ashcroft, the Third Circuit has expressed its preference that prisons and Congress use a standard more protective of prisoners. The district court should now take advantage of this opportunity by finding that the Pennsylvania prison policy impermissibly relied on the MPAA ratings in censoring films because the MPAA ratings should not be used to ground a rational basis between prison policy and the state's interest.
Courts are also at an impasse in deciding the legal enforceability of the MPAA ratings. Previously, courts have found the ratings to be completely amorphous and legally unenforceable. Now, courts have held that schools and courts may completely defer to CARA and the MPAA when censoring films. If courts continue to allow governmental agencies to rely upon MPAA ratings when censoring films, courts will be giving too much power to the MPAA, a private organization, to inform government censorship decisions based on nebulous standards. This use was not historically intended by the MPAA and is not justified. In essence, unless the Zimmer Amendment is found unconstitutional, a private organization will be allowed to decide what films can and cannot be seen by the American public. 3 The MPAA describes its ratings as follows:
G:"General Audiences-All Ages Admitted." This is a film which contains nothing in theme, language, nudity and sex, violence, etc. which would, in the view of the Rating Board, be offensive to parents whose younger children view the film. The G rating is not a "certificate of approval," nor does it signify a children's film. Some snippets of language may go beyond polite conversation but they are common everyday expressions. No stronger words are present in G-rated films. The violence is at a minimum. Nudity and sex scenes are not present; nor is there any drug use content.
PG:"Parental Guidance Suggested. Some Material May Not Be Suitable For Children." This is a film which clearly needs to be examined or inquired into by parents before they let their children attend. The label PG plainly states that parents may consider some material unsuitable for their children, but the parent must make the decision. Parents are warned against sending their children, unseen and without inquiry, to PG-rated movies. The theme of a PG-rated film may itself call for parental guidance. There may be some profanity in these films. There may be some violence or brief nudity. But these elements are not deemed so intense as to require that parents be strongly cautioned beyond the suggestion of parental guidance. There is no drug use content in a PG-rated film. The PG rating, suggesting parental guidance, is thus an alert for examination of a film by parents before deciding on its viewing by their children.
Obviously such a line is difficult to draw. In our pluralistic society it is not easy to make judgments without incurring some disagreement. So long as parents know they must exercise parental responsibility, the rating serves as a meaningful guide and as a warning.
V. Conclusion
ENDNOTES PG-13:"Parents Strongly Cautioned. Some Material May Be Inappropriate For Children Under 13." PG-13 is thus a sterner warning to parents to determine for themselves the attendance in particular of their younger children as they might consider some material not suited for them. Parents, by the rating, are alerted to be very careful about the attendance of their underteenage children. A PG-13 film is one which, in the view of the Rating Board, leaps beyond the boundaries of the PG rating in theme, violence, nudity, sensuality, language, or other contents, but does not quite fit within the restricted R category. Any drug use content will initially require at least a PG-13 rating. In effect, the PG-13 cautions parents with more stringency than usual to give special attention to this film before they allow their 12-year olds and younger to attend. If nudity is sexually oriented, the film will generally not be found in the PG-13 category. If violence is too rough or persistent, the film goes into the R (restricted) rating. A film's single use of one of the harsher sexually-derived words, though only as an expletive, shall initially require the Rating Board to issue that film at least a PG-13 rating. More than one such expletive must lead the Rating Board to issue a film an R rating, as must even one of these words used in a sexual context. These films can be rated less severely, however, if by a special vote, the Rating Board feels that a lesser rating would more responsibly reflect the opinion of American parents. PG-13 places larger responsibilities on parents for their children's moviegoing. The voluntary rating system is not a surrogate parent, nor should it be. It cannot, and should not, insert itself in family decisions that only parents can, and should, make. Its purpose is to give prescreening advance informational warnings, so that parents can form their own judgments. PG-13 is designed to make these parental decisions easier for films between PG and R.
R:"Restricted, Under 17 Requires Accompanying Parent Or Adult Guardian." In the opinion of the Rating Board, this film definitely contains some adult material. Parents are strongly urged to find out more about this film before they allow their children to accompany them.
An R-rated film may include hard language, or tough violence, or nudity within sensual scenes, or drug abuse or other elements, or a combination of some of the above, so that parents are counseled, in advance, to take this advisory rating very seriously. Parents must find out more about an R-rated movie before they allow their teenagers to view it. 12 Id. at 290. The Court even recognized that its decision was simply based on courts' historically not intervening in prison cases rather than any individualized judgment about the circumstances of the case before it. See id. (basing its decision on the fact that "the life of the law has been not in logic but experience"). 13 Surrette, supra note 7, at 924. Separation of powers was relevant because "[t]he management and control of prisons are generally viewed as executive and legislative functions. That courts should tell these co-equal branches of government how to run their penal institutions was troublesome." MUSHLIN, supra note 7, at §1.02 Because many of the cases in federal courts were brought by state prisoners, federalism was also a concern. "Federal courts expressed the concern that, by adjudicating these claims in a way that was favorable to inmates, they would be using federal power to dictate to the states how to run their own institutions." Id.
Courts cited judicial incompetence because of "the assumption that the management of prison requires considerable skill, training, and experience." Id. Judges consequently feared that reviewing prison policies would concomitantly minimize their authority. Finally, the fear of 'a flood of litigation' resulted from the "large number of inmates potentially willing to present their complaints, and [the] large variety of claims that might be pressed…." Id.
14 Surrette, supra note 7 at 924. 15 
Id.
16 Section 1983 provides, in part, that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, [or] regulation…of any State…subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States…to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law…." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 43 Id. at 826. 44 Id. at 823-28. 45 
46 482 U.S. 78 (1987) . 47 See, e.g., Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130-33 (1977) ; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Dei, supra note 6, at 408-14. 48 Dei, supra note 6, at 414-17 (discussing several cases where lower federal courts applied different tests). 49 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Dei, supra note 6, at 417. 50 Turner, 482 U.S. at 78. 51 Id. at 81-82 (quoting the prison regulation). 52 Id. at 82 (quoting the prison regulation). 53 Id. at 89. The Court explicitly rejected the strict scrutiny standard established in Procunier v. Martinez, holding that "[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration." Id. 54 Id. at 89-90 (internal citations omitted). 55 Id. at 93. The regulation promoted security because " [p] rison officials…stated that in their expert opinion, correspondence between prison institutions facilitates the development of informal organizations that threaten the core functions of prison administration…." Id. at 92. It was not an exaggerated response because there were no ready alternatives for prison officials. Those "officials testified that it would be impossible to read every piece of inmate-toinmate correspondence, and consequently there would be an appreciable risk of missing dangerous messages." Id. at 93 (internal citation omitted). 56 Id. at 98-99. One interest proffered by the state in denying many marriages was that "women prisoners needed to concentrate on developing skills of self-reliance…." Id. at 97. The Court found this purported interest suspect because "only one [marriage had been] refused on the basis of fostering excessive dependency." Id. at 99. The Court also found that the prohibition swept too broadly because "[t]here [we]re obvious, easy alternatives to the Missouri regulation" such as a policy where marriages are "generally permitted, but not if [the] warden finds that it presents a threat to security or order of [the] institution, or to public safety." Id. at 98.
